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Abstract—Recent advances in natural language generation
have introduced powerful language models with high-quality
output text. However, this raises concerns about the potential
misuse of such models for malicious purposes. In this paper,
we study natural language watermarking as a defense to help
better mark and trace the provenance of text. We introduce the
Adversarial Watermarking Transformer (AWT) with a jointly
trained encoder-decoder and adversarial training that, given an
input text and a binary message, generates an output text that is
unobtrusively encoded with the given message. We further study
different training and inference strategies to achieve minimal
changes to the semantics and correctness of the input text.
AWT is the first end-to-end model to hide data in text by
automatically learning -without ground truth- word substitutions
along with their locations in order to encode the message. We
show that our model is effective in largely preserving text utility
and decoding the watermark while hiding its presence against
adversaries. Additionally, we demonstrate that our method is
robust against a range of local changes and denoising attacks.
I. INTRODUCTION
Recent years have witnessed major achievements in natural
language processing (NLP), generation, and understanding.
This is in part driven by the introduction of attention-based
models (i.e. transformers [1]) that outperformed recurrent or
convolutional neural networks in many language tasks such
as machine translation [1], [2], language understanding [3],
[4], and language generation [5]. In addition, model pre-
training further fueled these advances and it is now a common
practice in NLP [6], [7]; many large-scale models are now pre-
trained on large datasets with either denoising auto-encoding
or language modelling objectives and then fine-tuned on other
NLP downstream tasks [3], [4], [8], [9], [10], [11].
On the other hand, this raises concerns about the potential
misuse of such powerful models for malicious purposes such
as spreading neural-generated fake news and misinformation.
For example, OpenAI1 used a staged release to publicize their
GPT-2 language model in order to evaluate the impact and
potential risks [12]. Moreover, Zellers et al. [5] proposed a
generative model called Grover demonstrating that a language
model such as GPT-2 can be trained on news articles and can
consequently generate realistically looking fake news.
These models can generate highly fluent text which some-
times had even higher ratings than human-written text and
fooled human detectors [5], [13], [14]. While it is now possible
to perform automatic detection, it is subject to recent advances
in text generation (e.g. architecture, model size, and decoding
1https://openai.com/blog/better-language-models/
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Fig. 1: An overview of our text watermarking solution at
inference time.
strategies) [5], [13], which could hinder the automatic de-
tection on the long run. Hence, we seek a more sustainable
solution that can disambiguate between real and fake text.
To this end, we aim to perform automatic data hiding
within language (by minimum changes) towards watermark-
ing the output of text generation models. Specifically, we
envision black-box access scenarios to services such as text
generation and editing-assistance that could be misused to
create misinformation. Watermarking can then be used to
introduce detectable fingerprints in the output that enable
provenance tracing and detection. As deep learning models are
widely deployed in the wild as services, they are subject to
many attacks that only require black-box access (e.g. model
stealing [15], [16], [17], black-box attacks [18]). Thus, it is
important to proactively provide defense solutions for such
attacks and other potential ones before their prevalence.
a) Language watermarking: There have been several
attempts to create data hiding methods for natural language
for the purpose of watermarking, such as synonym substitu-
tions [19], [20], syntactic tools (e.g. structural transformation
such as active-passive transformations [21]), in addition to
language-specific changes (e.g. Turkish [22], Chinese [23],
German [24]). However, these previous methods used fixed
rule-based substitutions that required extensive engineering
efforts to design, in addition to human input and annotations
which hinders the automatic transformation. Also, these meth-
ods are limited as the designed rules might not apply to all sen-
tences (e.g. no syntactic transformations can be applied [21]).
Additionally, they introduce large lexical or style changes to
the original text, which is not preferred when keeping the
original state is required (such as the output of an already well-
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trained language model). Besides, rule-based methods could
impose restrictions on the use of the language (e.g. by word
masking). Using fixed substitutions can systematically change
the text statistics which, in turn, undermines the secrecy of the
watermark and enables adversaries to automatically detect, and
consequently, remove the watermark.
b) Data hiding with neural networks: Similar to text,
data hiding can be done in other mediums as well such as
images [25]. Several end-to-end methods have been proposed
to substitute hand-crafted features and automatically hide and
reveal data (e.g. bit strings) in images. This can be done using
a jointly trained encoder and decoder architectures that could
be coupled with adversarial training to enforce the encoding
secrecy [26], [27], [28], [29], [30]. However, similar automatic
hiding approaches for language are still lacking, which could
be attributed to the relatively harder discrete nature of language
with having less redundancy compared to images.
c) Our approach: We introduce the Adversarial Wa-
termarking Transformer (AWT); a solution for automatically
hiding data in natural language without having paired training
data or designing rule-based encoding. Similar to sequence-to-
sequence machine translation models [31], AWT consists of a
transformer encoder-decoder component that takes an input
sentence and a binary message and produces an output text.
This component works as a hiding network, which is jointly
trained with a transformer encoder that takes the output text
only and works as a message decoder to reconstruct the binary
message. In order to enforce secrecy, we utilize adversarial
training [32] and train these two components against an
adversary that takes the input and modified text and performs
a classification between them. The model is jointly trained to
encode the message using the least amount of changes to the
input text, successfully decode the message, and at the same
time, fool the adversary. An example of using the data hiding
and revealing networks at test time is shown in Figure 1.
d) Challenges: We evaluate the performance of our
model on different axes inspired by the desired require-
ments: 1) The effectiveness denoted by message decoding
accuracy and preserving text utility (by introducing the least
amount of changes, and preserving semantic similarity and
grammatical correctness), 2) The secrecy of data encoding
against adversaries. 3) The robustness to removing attempts.
These requirements can be competing and reaching a trade-off
between them is needed. For example, having a perfectly and
easily decoded message can be done by changing the text sub-
stantially which affects the text preserving, or by inserting less
likely tokens which, in turn, affects the encoding secrecy. We
show that our model achieves a better trade-off between these
requirements compared to a baseline of synonym substitution
as a representative of rule-based methods.
e) Contributions: We formalize our contributions as
follows: 1) We present AWT; a novel approach that is the
first to use a learned end-to-end framework for data hiding
in natural language that can be used for watermarking. 2)
We study different variants of the model (by training with
auxiliary losses) in order to improve the text utility, secrecy,
and robustness. We measure the text utility with quantitative,
qualitative, and human evaluations. To evaluate the secrecy,
we analyze and visualize the modified text statistics and we
evaluate the performance of different adversaries. Besides, we
study the robustness under both random and denoising attacks.
3) We examine inference strategies that further maintain the
utility. 4) We show that our model achieves a better trade-off
compared to a rule-based baseline.
II. RELATED WORK
In this section, we summarize previous work related to
ours such as language watermarking, linguistic steganography,
sequence-to-sequence machine translation models, model wa-
termarking, and finally, neural text detection.
A. Language Watermarking
Watermarking for multimedia documents has many appli-
cations such as identifying and protecting authorship [33],
[34], [35], [36]. It consists of an embedding stage where the
hidden identifying information (i.e. watermark) is encoded in
the cover signal (e.g. text, image, video, or audio), however,
watermarking text or natural language is the least discussed
medium [33]. This is followed by a decoding stage where the
watermark is recovered from the signal. Blind-watermarking
(which we adopt) does not require accessing the original signal
to decode the watermark making it more practical.
Initial attempts for text watermarking aimed to watermark
documents rather than the language itself, this could be done
by altering documents characteristics such as characters’ ap-
pearance, fonts, and words or line spacing by specific patterns
depending on the codeword [37]. However, these methods are
prune to scanning and re-formatting attacks such as copying
and pasting [33], [38].
The other category of methods relies on linguistic charac-
teristics of the natural language such as making syntactic or
semantic changes to the cover text [38]. An example of such
is the synonym substitution method in [19] in which WordNet
was used to find synonyms of words that are then divided
into two groups to represent ‘0’ or ‘1’. The authors relied on
ambiguity by encoding the message with ambiguous words
or homographs (i.e. a word that has multiple meanings). This
was used to provide resilience as attackers would find it hard
to perform automatic disambiguation to return to the original
sentence. However, a sense/meaning-tagged dataset was used
that provides the original WordNet sense, which is not suitable
for automatic methods with no human input. Generally, syn-
onym substitution methods are vulnerable to an adversary who
performs random counter synonym substitutions, in addition,
they perform fixed pairwise substitutions which makes them
not flexible and also vulnerable to detection.
Additionally, sentence structure can be altered to encode
the codeword according to a defined encoding [21], [39].
These methods introduce changes such as passivization, cleft-
ing, extraposition, and preposing [38], [40]. However, these
transformations might not be applicable to all sentences which
could fail to encode the message, also, they change the
sentence to a large extent.
In contrast, we perform an end-to-end data hiding approach
that is data-driven and does not require efforts to design rules
and unique dictionary lookups. We optimize our method to
achieve the least amount of changes to the cover text and at
the same time conceal the encoding by adversarial training.
B. Linguistic Steganography
Similar to watermarking, steganography hides information
in text, with the goal typically being secret communication.
Steganography and watermarking might have different require-
ments [26], [19]; although both of them target stealthiness
to avoid detection, steganography does not assume an active
warden. Therefore, watermarking should also have robustness
to local changes that might remove the watermark. Addi-
tionally, in our case, watermarking should also preserve the
underlying cover text and utility, and should be applicable to
most sentences.
Similar to watermarking, translation by modifying a cover
text was used in steganography such as the work in [41],
[42], [43] that used a set of rule-based transformations to
convert tweets to possible translations. The encoding and
decoding were done with a keyed hash function to avoid
sharing the huge database of substitution rules; the translations
that map to the desired hash values were selected. Therefore,
the decoding is not robust to local changes to the sentence.
Another synonym-based method was proposed in [44] based
on assigning different bits to American and British words
which makes it not applicable to a large number of sentences.
Another steganography direction is to generate text according
to a shared key, instead of using translation. For example,
the work in [45] used a trained LSTM language model that
generates sentences according to a masked vocabulary and
a binary stream; the vocabulary was partitioned to different
segments where each segment was assigned a sequence of
bits. However, this imposes a large constraint on the usage
of the language model since it needs to abide by the mask-
ing. Therefore, these stated steganography solutions are not
suitable for our scenario as they specifically prioritize secret
communication over flexibility or watermarking requirements.
C. Sequence-to-Sequence Models
Our task bears a lot of similarity to machine translation,
specifically, to machine translation to the same language. It
is also similar to other applications such as style transfer
to anonymize text and hide authors’ attributes [46]. Neural
machine translations [47], [48], [1] are typically composed
of a sequence-to-sequence architecture with an encoder and
a decoder networks that were typically used to be recurrent
networks with an attention mechanism between them [47].
However, the state-of-the-art sequence-to-sequence models are
now composed of transformer architectures (which we thus
adopt) that replaced the recurrent connections by attention [1].
D. Model Watermarking
To protect the intellectual property of deep learning models,
several approaches have been recently proposed to watermark
models [49], [50], [51], [52]. This could be done either by
embedding the watermark into the model’s weights which
requires white-box access for verification [53], [54], [55], or by
assigning specific labels for a trigger set (i.e. backdoors [56])
which only requires black-box access [51], [49], [57]. To
protect against model extraction (by black-box queries), [58]
entangles the watermark and data representation to make the
watermark transferable to the extracted model. Other recent
works aimed at protecting against watermark piracy (i.e. the
adversary embeds his own watermark) by linking the original
task performance with the watermark [59], [60]. To incur a
minimum effect on the utility, [61] extracts fingerprinting data
of points near the classifier boundary, instead of embedding a
watermark into the model.
These methods were mainly addressing image classification
networks; there is no previous work that attempted to wa-
termark language models. We also differentiate our approach
from model watermarking; instead of watermarking a language
model, we study language watermarking using a deep learning
method that could eventually be used to watermark the lan-
guage model’s output. This makes the watermarking process
independent of the language model and the decoding strategy
used at test time.
E. Neural Text Detection
Similar to the arms race in image deepfakes detection [62],
[63], [64], recent approaches were proposed to detect machine-
generated text. For example, the Grover language model [5]
was fine-tuned as a classifier to discriminate between human-
written news and Grover generations. The authors reported that
the model size played an important factor in the arms race; if a
larger generator is used, the detection accuracy drops. Another
limitation was observed in [13] in which the authors fine-tuned
BERT to classify between human and GPT-2 generated text.
The classifier was sensitive to the decoding strategy used in
generation (top-k, top-p, and sampling from the untruncated
distribution). It also had poor transferability when trained with
a certain strategy and tested with another one. Therefore, while
detecting machine-generated text is an interesting problem, it
largely depends on the language model and decoding strategy.
Besides, this suggests that the success of classifiers might
drop based on future progress in language modelling [5] (e.g.
larger models [11], arbitrary order generation [65], or training
setups that could eventually reduce exposure bias [66]), in
addition to decoding strategies that could eventually reduce
statistical abnormalities without introducing semantic arti-
facts [13]. This is also similar to the limitations of image
deepfakes classifiers [67]. Thus, we seek a more sustainable
solution by watermarking. We propose an improved and learn-
able watermarking framework as an alternative solution that
could be applied to the language model’s output and that
is independent of these variations. Also, our watermarking
scheme is a multi-bit watermarking, hence, it can be used
for provenance tracing to multiple generators, while previous
binary classification methods considered generations from
only one model.
III. THREAT MODEL
In this section, we discuss our usage scenario, requirements,
and attacks.
a) Watermarking as a defense against models’ abuse:
We study watermarking as a sustainable solution towards
provenance tracing of machine-generated text in the case of
models’ abuse. An example of that scenario is a black-box text
generation service that has legitimate usages such as editing
assistance. The service is offered by the language model’s
owner or creator. However, it can be used in an unintended way
by an adversary to automatically generate entire fake articles
or misinformation, aiming to achieve financial gains or serve
a political agenda [5]. Owners can then proactively and in a
responsible manner provide a way to identify and detect the
model’s generations by watermarking its output [67].
News platforms can cooperate with models’ owners in order
to identify the watermarks in the news articles and, thus,
detect machine-generated articles. That is similar to [5] that
suggests that news platforms can use the Grover classifier
to detect Grover articles. This is also in line with video-
sharing platforms such as YouTube that uses deep networks to
detect pornographic content [68], and [69] which suggests that
YouTube can use machine learning classifiers to flag videos
that are likely to be targeted by organized hate attacks.
Although we envision our framework as a solution towards
watermarking language models’ output, we propose a general
improved and learning-based data hiding framework for natu-
ral language that could be adapted for watermarking in other
applications such as protecting authorship intellectual property.
b) Watermarking using AWT: The hiding network (mes-
sage encoder) of AWT is used to embed a watermark (m)
into the text. The same message encoder can be used to
encode different watermarks (m1, m2, ..., mn) if needed (e.g.
if the service is shipped to different parties). The multi-bit
watermarking framework (as opposed to zero-bit) helps to
trace provenance to the different parties. The revealing network
(message decoder) of AWT can, in turn, be used to reveal a
watermark m′ which is then matched to the set of watermarks
(m1, m2, ..., mn).
c) Requirements and attacks: However, the objective is
not only to hide data in text; we define the problem as a trade-
off between these requirements:
• Effectiveness: The watermark should be successfully
embedded and verified. At the same time, it should keep
the text (e.g. service) utility; it should introduce the least
amount of changes to the cover text, and ideally produce
natural, grammatically and semantically correct changes.
Thus, we study the trade-off between text utility and bit
accuracy and examine different strategies to improve it.
• Secrecy: The watermark should achieve stealthiness by
not introducing evident changes that can be easily de-
tectable by automated classifiers. Ideally, it should be in-
distinguishable from non-watermarked text. This, in part,
contributes to the text utility preserving factor. Besides,
it helps to avoid suspicion and hinders the adversary’s
efforts to remove or spoof the watermark by identifying
it first. Therefore, we study the watermark secrecy and
consider a range of possible discriminators.
• Robustness: The watermark should be resilient and not
easily removable by simple changes. Ideally, to remove
the watermark, one has to introduce heavy modifications
that render the text ‘unusable’. Satisfying the previous
two requirements (text utility and secrecy) can, in part,
contribute to the robustness, since the adversary would
not be able to distinguish the watermark. The adver-
sary’s objective would be to remove the watermark from
the service’s output while largely preserving the output
(i.e. utility). To that end, we consider attacks such as
introducing random changes to the text, e.g. synonym
replacement, or randomly removing parts of the text.
Additionally, we consider other attempts such as training
a denoising autoencoder to denoise the watermarked text.
IV. ADVERSARIAL WATERMARKING TRANSFORMER
We propose the Adversarial Watermarking Transformer
(AWT) as an end-to-end framework for language watermark-
ing. As shown in Figure 2, the proposed solution includes a
hiding network, a revealing network, and they are both trained
against a discriminator. In the rest of this section, we discuss
the details of these components and the network optimization
and training procedures.
A. Hiding Network (Message Encoder)
This component is responsible for translating the input
text to the watermarked text. Similar to sequence-to-sequence
models, it consists of an encoder and decoder.
a) Encoder: The encoder (E) is a transformer-encoder
block consisting of several transformer encoder layers. Each
layer consists of a self-attention block followed by a fully-
connected layer. The encoder takes an input sentence S =
{W0,W1, ...,Wn}, consisting of one-hot encoded words that
are then projected to the embedding space using the word-
embedding layer. As transformers are position-invariant, posi-
tion embeddings (sinusoidal embeddings [1]) are then added
to the word embeddings. The encoder produces a fixed-length
vector which is an average pooling across the time dimension
of the last encoder layer [70].
b) Message: The input message: M = {b0, b1, ..., bq}
(consisting of q binary bits sampled randomly), is first fed to
a fully connected layer in order to match the embeddings’ di-
mension, and is then added to the sentence encoding produced
by the encoder. This produces a shared embedding between
the sentence and the message which is then passed to the auto-
regressive decoder and added to its input at each time-step.
c) Decoder: The decoder (D) has a similar architecture
as the encoder, in addition to having an attention layer over the
encoder’s output. In paired machine translation, the decoder
usually takes the ground-truth target sequence (shifted right),
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Fig. 2: The architecture of AWT . The model consists of a data hiding network (sequence-to-sequence model), a data revealing
network to decode the message, and a discriminator, in addition to the auxiliary components used at the fine-tuning step.
and is trained to predict the next word at each time step.
Since our problem does not have paired training data, the
model is trained as an auto-encoder [70]; the decoder takes
the shifted input sentence and is trained to reconstruct the
sequence given to the encoder, producing an output sentence
S
′
= {W ′0,W
′
1, ...,W
′
n}. This serves as the reconstruction
component in similar image data hiding methods [26], and it
helps to largely preserve the input. In order to train the whole
network jointly and allow back-propagation from the other
components, we use Gumbel-Softmax approximation [71],
[72] with one-hot encoding in the forward pass (Straight-
Through Gumbel Estimator using argmax [71]), and dif-
ferentiable soft samples in the backward pass (softmax is
used to approximate the argmax operation [71]). The text
reconstruction loss is the cross-entropy loss:
Lrec = Epdata(S)[− logPD(S)]
B. Revealing Network (Message Decoder)
This part of the network is responsible for reconstructing
the input message. It takes the one-hot samples produced by
the auto-encoder, multiplied by the embedding matrix, and
with adding position embeddings. The message decoder (M )
is a transformer-encoder block, since it is typically used in
text classification applications [4], [13]. The output of the last
transformer encoder layer is then averaged across the time
dimension and fed to a fully connected layer with an output
size that is equivalent to the message length q. The message
reconstruction loss is the binary cross-entropy over all bits:
Lm = −
q∑
i=1
bi log(p(bi)) + (1− bi) log(1− p(bi))
Weight tying: In order to reduce the number of parameters in
the network, we share the embedding weights across the whole
network [1] (i.e. text auto-encoder including the encoder and
decoder, message decoder, and discriminator). We also share
the embedding weights with the pre-softmax layer that maps
from the embedding space to tokens in the text decoder [73],
[1], [74]. In addition, we found it beneficial in terms of the
model size and faster convergence to also share the weights
between the encoder part of the text auto-encoder and the
message decoder.
C. Discriminator
In order to have a subtle message encoding that does not
alter the language statistics, we utilize adversarial training and
train the previous two components against a discriminator.
The discriminator (A) is a transformer-encoder with a similar
structure to the message decoder. It takes the non-watermarked
sentences S and the watermarked sentences S
′
(one-hot en-
coded) and is trained to classify between them using the binary
cross-entropy loss:
Ldisc = − log(A(S))− log(1−A(S′))
while the adversarial loss is: LA = − log(A(S′)). As we show
later, we found this component essential in supporting the
watermark secrecy against adversaries.
D. Training and Fine-tuning
The model is first trained jointly with the above three losses
with weighted averaging:
L1 = wALA + wrecLrec + wmLm
These losses are competing; e.g. a perfect sentence reconstruc-
tion would fail to encode the message. Therefore, we tuned
the losses weights in order to achieve a good trade-off. For
example, it was helpful to assign a relatively higher weight to
the message loss, otherwise the reconstruction dominates. We
did not need to anneal the message weight after the start. The
other losses had comparable weights to each other.
The previous loss function aims to preserve the input
sentence and encode the message with the least amount of
changes while not changing the text statistics. However, we
still do not have an explicit constraint on the type of changes
done by the network to encode the message. Therefore, after
training the network with L1, we further fine-tune the network
to achieve semantic consistency and grammatical correctness.
a) Preserving semantics: One way to force the output
to be semantically similar to the input sentence is to embed
both sentences into a semantic embedding space and compute
the distance between the two encodings. We follow [46] and
use the pre-trained Facebook sentence embedding model [75]
that was trained to produce a sentence representation based
on the natural language inference (NLI) task. The model was
trained on the Stanford Natural Language Inference (SNLI)
dataset [76]. We fix the sentence encoder (F ) weights and use
it to compute the semantic loss between S and S
′
as follows:
Lsem = ||F (S)− F (S′)||
b) Sentence correctness: To explicitly enforce correct
grammar and structure, we fine-tune the model with a language
model loss [46]. We independently trained the AWD-LSTM
(ASGD Weight-Dropped LSTM) [73] on the used dataset,
as a medium-scale, but widely used and effective language
model [7], [77], [78]. We then use the trained AWD-LSTM
model (LM ) with fixing its weight to compute the likelihood
of the output sentence S
′
. Sentences with higher likelihood
are more likely to be syntactically similar to the original text
used in training. The language model loss is defined as:
LLM = −
∑
i
log pLM(W
′
i |W
′
<i)
These previous two components take the one-hot samples
and map them to their respective embedding space. We fine-
tune the network using these two losses in addition to the
previous ones as follows: L2 = wALA + wrecLrec + wmLm +
wsemLsem + wLMLLM.
As we later show in our experiments, we found that fine-
tuning with these auxiliary losses helps to produce more
realistically looking and natural samples compared to only
training with reconstructing the sentence.
V. EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS
In this section, we first discuss our setup. Then, we evaluate
the different aspects of our model: effectiveness (message de-
coding and text utility), secrecy, and robustness. We compare
AWT to baselines and present the results of a user study to
evaluate the output’s quality.
A. Setup
a) Dataset: We used the word-level WikiText-2 (WT2)
that is curated from Wikipedia articles with light processing
and was introduced in [79]. We used the same tokenization,
processing, and split setup as [79], [73], [80]. The dataset
is approximately twice the size of the Penn Treebank (PTB)
benchmark dataset for language modelling [81], besides, the
WikiText-2 keeps the capitalization, punctuation, and numbers.
It contains over 30,000 unique vocabulary words and has a
size of 2 million words in the training set and 0.2 million in
validation and test sets. Since our watermarking framework
can be applied independently as a post-processing step, we
experiment on human-written data to objectively judge the
proposed watermarking scheme correctness and to use a
benchmark pre-processed dataset.
b) Implementation details: We implemented our model
and experiments with the PyTorch framework2. We encode
a message per sentence/text segment; we used a message
length of 4 bits (similar to the translation-based steganographic
system in [41]) with uniform sampling during training, and a
varying text segment with normal distribution N (80, 5). For
the transformer blocks, we used a dimension size (dmodel)
of 512. Besides, the encoder and decoder transformer blocks
are composed of 3 identical layers and 4 attention heads per
layer, the decoder has a masked self-attention. For the rest of
the transformer hyperparameters, we used the default PyTorch
implementation that adopts [1]. We optimize the network with
Adam optimizer [82] and we vary the learning rate during
training according to [1]:
lrategen = d−0.8model ∗min(step−0.5, step ∗ warmup−1.5)
lratedisc = d−1.1model ∗min(step−0.5, step ∗ warmup−1.5)
where lrategen is the learning rate of the autoencoder and
message decoder, and lratedisc is the learning rate of the
discriminator, trained alternatively. We used 6000 warmup
steps. We use a Gumbel temperature of 0.5 [46], [83].
B. Effectiveness Evaluation
In this section, we evaluate the effectiveness of the model
in terms of text utility and bit accuracy. We discuss our
evaluation metrics and we compare different model’s variants.
We examine different inference strategies and sentence aggre-
gation to improve the trade-off between text quality and bit
accuracy. We then perform a qualitative analysis to visualize
and assess the changes produced by the model.
1) Metrics: To measure the message decoding perfor-
mance, we use the bitwise message accuracy (random chance:
50%) averaged across all sentences in the test set. To measure
utility preserving, we use the meteor score [84] that is used
in machine-translation and image captioning applications to
compare the output sentence against ground-truth references.
Meteor performs n-gram alignments between the candidate
and output text with synonym lookups from WordNet [85].
It ranges from 0 (no similarity) to 1 (identical sentences).
However, we found that the meteor score is not enough to
evaluate the text semantics; two output sentences can have
the same number of changed words compared to the input
sentence and thus a similar meteor score (assuming there is
no synonym overlapping), however, one of them could be
closer to the input sentence. Therefore, to approximate the
semantic difference between the input and output text, we used
SBERT [86], a pre-trained sentence embeddings model based
on fine-tuning BERT as a siamese network on the NLI task.
We compute the input and output embeddings and calculate the
L2 difference between them (lower is better). We later discuss
more details about the importance of using this additional
metric in Section V-B5 and Appendix VII-A.
2https://pytorch.org/
Model Bit accuracy Meteor SBERT distance
AWT 97% 0.96 1.25
− fine-tuning 96% 0.94 1.73
− discriminator 95% 0.94 2.28
TABLE I: Model’s variants quantitative analysis. The first row
is the full model with adversarial training and fine-tuning. The
second row is without fine-tuning. The third row is without
fine-tuning and adversarial training.
2) Model ablation: We show in Table I three variants of our
model. The first row shows the full AWT with the fine-tuning
step, the second one shows the model without fine-tuning, and
the last row shows the model without discriminator and fine-
tuning (trained only with text and message reconstruction).
This shows that the fine-tuning step helps to improve the
text preserving and semantics as suggested by the increase
in the meteor score and the decrease in the SBERT distance,
at the same time, it maintains a high message decoding
accuracy. Additionally, the model trained with a discriminator
had a lower SBERT distance compared to the model that was
trained with text reconstruction only, although both of them
have a comparable meteor score. As we demonstrate in our
qualitative and secrecy analysis shown later, this indicates that
the adversarial training setup improves the output’s quality, in
addition to its secrecy advantages3.
3) Inference strategies: To further maintain the text utility
and improve the output sequence’s quality, we study two
inference strategies. First, we sample a set of samples for
each sentence and then select the best sample, based on
possible quality metrics. Second, we deliberately leave some
sentences non-watermarked. Both approaches have a trade-
off relationship with bit accuracy, however, to watermark
an article, it is possible to aggregate observations from the
whole document, relaxing the need for having correct message
decoding for each sentence, we discuss this in Section V-B4.
a) Best-of-many encoding: We here sample n sentences
for each input sentence using the Gumbel sampler in the
autoencoder network. We then use the trained language model
(AWD-LSTM) to compute the likelihood for each output
sample. Then, we pick the sample with the highest likelihood
(excluding samples with no changes to the input) and feed
it to the message decoder. An alternative quality metric is to
pick the sample with the lowest SBERT distance to the input
sentence, we found that these two metrics give comparable
results, however, using the language model gives slightly better
samples in terms of grammatical and syntactic correctness
(discussed in Section V-B5 and Appendix VII-A).
We show in Figure 3 different operating points based on
varying n from 1 to 40 samples. For each point, we show
the relationship between bit accuracy and text utility (demon-
strated by the averaged meteor score and SBERT distance). We
found that the meteor score increases and the SBERT distance
decreases with increasing the number of samples. Additionally,
3Unless mentioned otherwise, all the following experiments are performed
on the fine-tuned model, and AWT stands for the best model with adversarial
training and fine-tuning.
82.5 85.0 87.5 90.0 92.5 95.0 97.5
Bit Accuracy (%)
0.9
1.0
1.1
1.2
SB
ER
T d
ist
an
ce
SBERT
0.9625
0.9650
0.9675
0.9700
0.9725
0.9750
0.9775
Me
te
or
 sc
or
e
Best-of-many encoding
Meteor
Fig. 3: Different operating points from best-of-many sampling
encoding; number of samples ranges from 1 (highest bit
accuracy) to 40 (lowest bit accuracy).
we show in Figure 4 and Figure 5 a histogram of the SBERT
distances and meteor scores respectively, for two sampling
settings; only 1 sample (bit accuracy 97%), and selecting the
best from 30 samples (bit accuracy ∼ 85%). In the latter
case, the output is moving towards identical reconstruction.
This analysis suggests that higher-quality output sentences can
be acquired by sampling and that the language model metric
also correlates with the meteor and SBERT ones. In addition,
having different possible translations is convenient in the case
of interactive services, as the user can pick in a flexible way
the preferred sentence.
b) Selective encoding: Alternatively, we leave a per-
centage of sentences non-watermarked to reduce the overall
change to the output text. Similar to sampling, this can also
be helpful in interactive services if the user prefers to have
some sentences unchanged. The message decoder side does
not need to know which sentences were watermarked as it can
attempt to decode the message from all sentences and base the
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Fig. 4: Histograms of SBERT distances in 2 settings of
sampling (lower is better).
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Fig. 5: Histograms of meteor scores in 2 settings of sampling
(higher is better).
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Fig. 6: Different operating points from selective encoding
based on thresholding. Thresholds are based on the quantiles
of the increase in the language model loss (encoding 75% to
100% of sentences).
decision on the whole document. We decide which sentences
to leave based on setting a threshold on the increase of the
language model loss compared to the original sentence. We
examine different thresholds that encode different quantiles of
the test set sentences (from 75% to 100%). We perform this
experiment with sampling only 1 sample from the model. We
show in Figure 6 the mean meteor and SBERT distance versus
bit accuracy at each quantile. Besides the flexibility and utility
advantage, selective encoding hinders the adversary effort to
localize the watermark as not all sentences are watermarked.
4) Sentences aggregation: The previous strategies help to
improve the output’s quality. However, they reduce the bit
accuracy. Therefore, in this section, we discuss two approaches
to recover from this drawback.
a) Concatenation: To allow a large number of water-
marks, a longer watermark can be composed of multipliers
of 4 bits messages; each 4 bits are embedded into one text
segment (we use a segment length of 80 words). If the text
(e.g. article) is longer than the watermark, the sequence can
be repeated partially or fully. The length of the unique long
watermark can be determined based on the expected minimum
text length. The decoded messages can be then verified against
the sequence. Thus, we can accumulate observations from all
messages in the document to perform a null hypothesis test
based on the number of matching bits [87]. We assume that the
null hypothesis (H0) is getting this number of matching bits by
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Fig. 7: Percentage of instances where the null hypothesis
(getting this matching number of bits by chance) is rejected
(p-value < 0.05) versus text and bit length (words/bits), done
for different operating points (indicated by bit accuracy).
chance. Under the null hypothesis, the probability of matching
bits (random variable X) follows a binomial distribution; the
number of trials is the number of bits in the sequence (n), k
is the number of successes (matching bits), and each bit has a
0.5 probability of success. We can then compute the p-value
of the hypothesis test by computing the probability of getting
k or higher matching bits under the null hypothesis:
Pr(X > k|H0) =
n∑
i=k
(
n
i
)
0.5n
The watermark is verified if the p-value is smaller than a
threshold T ; meaning that it is not very likely to get this se-
quence by chance. This allows a soft matching of the decoded
watermark instead of an exact one. In our experiments, we set
T to 0.05 as a commonly used significance level [87].
We empirically find the percentage of instances where the
null hypothesis can be rejected (i.e. the watermark is correctly
verified), and its relationship with the text length (i.e. the
number of bits in the sequence). We perform this at different
operating points that vary in their bit accuracy. We demonstrate
this experiment in Figure 7; when increasing the text length,
we observe more correct observations, and thus, can reject
the null hypothesis. Therefore, the use of operating points can
be flexibly determined by the expected text length; at longer
lengths, it is affordable to use an operating point with lower bit
accuracy (i.e. higher utility). Besides, as required, we validate
that the bit accuracy is close to chance level (49.9%) when
the input is non-watermarked data, which resulted, naturally,
in high p-values (and low false-positive rates).
b) Averaging: We here aim to improve the bit accuracy,
this can be needed in applications where one is interested
in decoding the message itself. We encode multiple text
segments/sentences with the same binary message, decode
each sentence independently, and then average their posterior
probabilities. We demonstrate in Figure 8 the performance gain
when averaging up to 4 sentences, compared to using only 1
sentence. We perform this analysis for 4 different operating
points that depend on the number of samples in the best-of-
many samples encoding strategy. As can be observed, using
only 2 sentences can increase the bit accuracy for all operating
points. Increasing the number of sentences can still further
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Fig. 8: Bit accuracy for 4 sampling operating points when
averaging the posterior of multiple sentences encoded with
the same message.
improve the accuracy. This strategy can be used by repeating
the messages in the document with an agreed-upon sequence.
5) Qualitative analysis: In this section, we qualitatively
analyse the model’s output. We first compare different variants,
we then discuss the implications of the used metrics. Lastly,
we visualize and analyse the changes performed by the model.
a) Model’s variants: To examine the effect of the ad-
versarial training, we show in Table II examples of input and
output pairs of the model trained with text reconstruction only
(the third row in Table I). We observed that there are two
main problems with this model: first, it performs systematic
and fixed modifications that alter the text statistics, e.g. the
word “the” is often changed. Second, it encodes the message
with tokens that have low occurrences count in the natural
text. These two problems could make the watermark easily
detectable by adversaries (and thus removable). It also makes
the output less natural and reduces the semantic correctness
(which is indicated by the higher SBERT distance in Table I,
supporting the use of an additional metric besides the meteor).
To further validate this observation, we show in Figure 9 the
occurrences of the top words in this model compared to their
occurrences in the AWT model and the original text. Unlike
AWT , this model’s variant pushes unlikely words to the top
and decreases the count of more likely words (e.g. “the”),
which introduces clear artifacts. In contrast, AWT keeps the
distribution of top words similar and encodes the message with
also likely words, and therefore it provides better concealing.
The model without fine-tuning also keeps the top words
counts similar (not shown in the figure), but it still shows
syntactic inconsistencies, e.g. using the end-of-sentence token
in the middle of the sentence. We observed that fine-tuning
the model helps to reduce these inconsistencies, examples are
shown in Table III.
We also show in Table IV examples of input and output pairs
obtained using AWT and the best-of-many sampling strategy (n
= 20 samples). The hidden information in these examples was
encoded using common tokens (e.g. preposition, articles, or
auxiliary verbs), correct structure, and with a very comparable
meaning to the input sentence.
Even though fine-tuning and sampling improve the quality
of the output to a large extent, we still observed some
failure cases of incorrect replacements that cause grammatical
and syntactic mistakes. Examples of such cases are shown
in Table V. One common failure mode happens when the
type of the word changes. However, this cannot be entirely
generalized as a failure case, e.g. some examples in Table IV
removed a verb (“had”) with an adverb (“also”) while still
Input − discriminator output
He was appointed the commanding officer.
He was appointed Bunbury commanding
officer.
one of the most fascinating characters in the
series
one of Milton most fascinating characters in
Milton series
TABLE II: Examples of input and output pairs of the model
trained without adversarial training showing systematic fixed
changes that insert less likely tokens.
Input − fine-tuning output AWT output
the Business Corporation,
which was formed by a
group of leaders from the
area.
the Business Corporation,
<eos> was formed by a
group of leaders from the
area.
the Business Corporation,
which was formed by a
group of leaders at the area.
The railroads provided a
means of transportation and
an influx of industries
The railroads provided a
means of transportation and
<eos> influx of industries
The railroads provided a
means of transportation and
that influx of industries
the measurements indicated
that a segment of M @-@
82 west of <unk> had the
peak volume for the high-
way
the measurements indicated
that a segment of M @-
@ 82 west of <unk>’s the
peak volume for the high-
way
the measurements indicated
that a segment of M @-@
82 west of <unk> were the
peak volume for the high-
way
TABLE III: Comparison between two variants of the model:
before and after fine-tuning. The fine-tuned model shows better
syntactic consistency.
being grammatically correct and also semantically consistent.
b) Metrics analysis: We use the SBERT distance as an
evaluation metric in addition to using the language model
likelihood as a sorting metric. Therefore, we validate them
by evaluating their recall of the best sample. On a subset of
100 input sentences, we use AWT to generate 10 samples for
each input sentence. We examine the possible sentences to
find the best sample (in terms of both semantic similarity
and grammatical correctness). For 92 out of 100 sentences,
we found that the best sample is retrieved by either one or
both metrics. This suggests that these two evaluation methods
correlate with human annotation.
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Fig. 9: Top words count in the model trained without adver-
sarial training compared to their counts in AWT output and the
original dataset.
Input AWT output
In 1951 , a small airstrip was built at the
ruins
In 1951 , a small airstrip was built on the
ruins
It is the opening track from their 1987 album It is the opening track of their 1987 album
the ancient city is built from limestone the ancient city is built with limestone
He also performed as an actor and a singer He had performed as an actor and a singer
While <unk> had retained some control of
the situation
While <unk> also retained some control of
the situation
It is bordered on the east side by identical
temples
It is bordered at the east side by identical
temples
a family that ’s half black , half white , half
American , half British
a family that was half black , half white ,
half American , half British
they called out to the other passengers , who
they thought were still alive .
they called out to the other passengers , who
they thought , still alive .
, but the complex is broken up by the heat
of cooking
, and the complex is broken up by the heat
of cooking
TABLE IV: Examples of input and output pairs using AWT
where the meaning and correctness are preserved.
Input AWT output
He is also present in the third original video
animation
He is could present in the third original
video animation
resulting in a population decline as workers
left for other areas
resulting in a population decline an workers
left for other areas
government officials had been suspected government officials at been suspected
who has been in office since 2009 who has were in office since 2009
The M @-@ 82 designation was truncated
at this time
The M @-@ 82 designation was truncated
were this time
TABLE V: Examples of failure modes showing input and
output pairs with grammatical errors.
Since we use the language model to sort samples, we
compare the best sample by the SBERT versus the best sample
by the language model. On a subset of 200 sentences: the two
metrics yielded the same sample in 44% of the cases, while
they yielded comparable samples in 25%. The SBERT metric
had a better sample in 9%, while the language model had a
better sample in 22%. This shows that they have compara-
ble performance, however, the language model was slightly
better and more sensitive to grammar correctness (see Ap-
pendix VII-A). Additionally, more qualitative examples of the
SBERT distance metric are demonstrated in Appendix VII-A.
c) Visualizations and analysis: To further visualize the
types of changes performed by the model at scale, we analyzed
the count of transitions between words in the input to output
text, as shown in Figure 10. We performed this analysis on
the most commonly changed words (or changed to), shown
in Appendix VII-B. Based on this analysis, we highlight the
following observations: 1) Words are not consistently replaced
since the diagonal line has a high count, meaning that in most
occurrences, the model keeps these most commonly changed
words unchanged. 2) There are no clear sparse transitions
between words; meaning that a word is not always replaced
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Fig. 10: A matrix of word changes count from original text to
modified text using AWT .
by a specific word. 3) These message-holding words are not
exclusive to the watermark occurrence. 4) These words are all
from the most occurring words in the dataset (see Figure 9).
These observations suggest that the model does not produce
obvious artifacts or telltale signs in terms of changing the
statistics of top words. In addition, there are no fixed rules
that could describe or substitute the changes since it does not
perform systematic changes between pairs of words. Thus,
these factors contribute to the hidden encoding of information.
C. Secrecy Evaluation
The previous analysis shows that the model hides the infor-
mation in a natural way by optimizing the translations to be as
close and correct as possible to the original text. Nevertheless,
we systematically validate the secrecy by training classifiers to
discriminate between encoded and non-encoded text. Although
secret communication is not the primary task in watermarking,
the adversary might train a classifier in order to help remove
or spoof the watermark (e.g. by adversarial training).
We train the classifiers on non-paired (i.e. disjoint) wa-
termarked and non-watermarked text, that is a reasonable
assumption since the adversary does not have access to text
before watermarking. We split the training data into two equal
parts and use AWT to watermark one of them by different
messages sampled randomly. Similarly, we watermark the test
and validation sets, but we use the entire sets for each class.
We measure the classifiers’ success by the F1 score; ideally,
it should be at a chance level performance (0.5), denoting the
adversary’s failure.
We compare the classifiers’ success on different model’s
variants; the no-discriminator model, the no fine-tuning model,
and the full AWT . Since we use a transformer-based dis-
criminator in AWT , we also study the generalization with
respect to different classifiers (transformer, LSTM, and Bag-
of-Words with Support Vector Machines [88]). The LSTM
and transformer classifiers are trained on single length-varying
sentences (similar to AWT training). The BoW+SVM classifier
is trained on word occurrences’ feature vectors in paragraphs
(up to 800 words). For each classifier, we optimize the
hyperparameters and show the results of the most adversarial
ones. Finally, we examine the effect of improving the quality
(by sampling) on the classifiers’ performance. As depicted
in Table VI, we summarize our main conclusions as follows:
1) The no-discriminator model shows very high F1 scores
(especially on longer sequences) indicating poor hiding capa-
bility, which supports our previous qualitative observations. 2)
The adversarially trained models show considerably lower F1
score across different classifiers. 3) Improving the quality (by
sampling) helps to further reduce the classifiers’ success. 4)
The full AWT with sampling model has a very close to the
ideal random chance performance.
D. Robustness Evaluation
Regardless of the secrecy, the adversary might apply dif-
ferent attacks on the watermarked text. The attacker goal is
to remove the watermark with minimal changes to the text,
Model’s variant Sampling Classifier F1 score
− discriminator 1 sample
Transformer 0.89
LSTM 0.80
BoW+SVM 0.98
− fine-tuning 1 sample
Transformer 0.65
LSTM 0.56
BoW+SVM 0.63
Best of 20 samples Transformer 0.59
AWT Best of 20 samples Transformer 0.53
TABLE VI: Secrecy evaluation of different model’s variants
indicated by the F1 score of the adversary.
in order to still have a high utility. Therefore, for each attack,
we study the relationship between the drop in bit accuracy and
the decrease in text similarity. We focus on automated attacks
without human inspection or modification [5], [19].
1) Random changes: We first study the robustness against
random changes to the watermarked text. We study two types
of random changes: removing words and replacing words
with synonyms. For each attack, we change each word with
a probability p that we vary from 0.05 to 0.2 with 0.05
difference. For each case, we compute the bit accuracy and
SBERT distance. For synonym substitution, we use WordNet
as a commonly used lexical database to find synonyms for
words to be replaced. Instead of the naive random replacement,
we assume that the attacker has access to a model like SBERT
and uses it to select the synonym that gives the lowest distance
from the set of possible synonyms.
We demonstrate the results of these two attacks in Figure 11.
We perform these attacks on the output of AWT using 1
sample in Figure 11a, and 20 samples in Figure 11b. The
‘remove’ attack was found to be slightly more successful than
the ‘replace’ attack since not all words used to encode the
message have synonyms in WordNet. However, For both the
two attacks and the two operating points, the bit accuracy
decreased by from 0.05% up to 6.5%, while on the other hand,
the SBERT increased by from 86% up to 577%. This shows
that the bit accuracy is robust to local changes and that the
adversary needs to substantially change the text by random
changes in order to make the watermark not usable.
2) Training counter-models: Instead of random changes, a
more knowledgeable adversary might train counter-models to
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Fig. 11: Random attacks (replacing and removing words) and
denoising attack (applied to noisy text), applied to the 1-
sample output (a), and the best of 20 samples output (b).
remove the watermark. We train a transformer-based denoising
autoencoder (DAE) [10] (sequence-to-sequence model) that
is tasked to denoise an input sequence. We apply two types
of noise to the input sequence (S): embedding dropout, and
random word replacement, to form a corrupted sequence (Sˆ).
The noise is applied with a 5% probability. Sˆ is then fed to
the encoder. The decoder is tasked to reconstruct the original
sequence S, and is fed the shifted S. The denoising maximizes
p(S|Sˆ), which can be described as [10]:
p(S|Sˆ) =
n∏
i=1
p(Wi|Sˆ,W<i)
That is: predicting Wi is conditioned on the full corrupted
sequence Sˆ and the left side non-noisy sequence W<i.
In our attack, we perform the DAE training on non-
watermarked text, and use the trained DAE to denoise the
watermarked text at test time. If the DAE was trained on water-
marked text, it would be tasked to reconstruct it and therefore
would not change the watermark. In contrast, with the current
setup, the watermark could approximate the noise applied
during the DAE training. The applied word replacement noise
is particularly in line with our watermarking scheme that is
also based on word replacement.
We hypothesize that a less natural encoding of the in-
formation would be more vulnerable to denoising than a
more natural one. To validate this, we apply the DAE on
the output of the three model’s variants that we previously
discussed, without applying additional noise. We demonstrate
this experiment in Table VII in which we show the bit accuracy
drop and the SBERT relative change. We summarize our
interpretation as follows: 1) Improving the quality makes the
denoising attack less effective; the ‘no-discriminator’ model
had a huge drop in bit accuracy and it reached a chance
level, while it decreased slightly for the other variants, in
particular the better-quality AWT model. 2) The DAE does
not perfectly reconstruct the sentences and still introduces
other changes besides the watermark’s changes, this increased
the SBERT distance for the two adversarially trained models.
3) On the other hand, the changes introduced to the ‘no-
discriminator’ model reduced the SBERT, indicating more
successful denoising. We show examples of these different
cases and more details about the DAE in Appendix VII-C.
We then study a different attack variant where we introduce
additional noise to the watermarked text before applying the
DAE. This is, instead of applying random word replacement
solely as an attack, we apply these random changes that might
remove the watermark, and then use the DAE to generate
Model Bit accuracy drop SBERT change
AWT 2.1% 30.4%↑
− fine-tuning 6.2% 22.3%↑
− discriminator 46% 17.1%↓
TABLE VII: Denoising autoencoder attack applied to the three
variants of the model.
a more realistic/smoothed sentence than the corrupted one.
Similarly, we vary the probability of the noise and study the
relationship between bit accuracy and SBERT distance. We
show in Figure 11 the performance of this attack in comparison
with random changes alone. We found that this variant is more
effective than using random changes; at the same level of
SBERT, the drop in bit accuracy is higher. However, it still
causes a significant increase in the SBERT distance (e.g. at a
10% drop in bit accuracy, the SBERT increased by 319%).
For both secrecy and robustness, it could be conceivable
that other attacks might be more successful by e.g. training
larger models or having massive datasets, however, this would
require an adversary with even more technical knowledge of
recent advances that are less known to the public, and more
costly and powerful computation resources.
E. Baselines
In this section, we compare AWT against baselines. First,
we implement a rule-based synonym substitution method
that adopts the method in [19]. Second, as an alternative
to translation-based data hiding, we train an autoregressive
language model, while simultaneously optimizing the message
encoding and decoding.
1) Synonym substitution: The method in [19] uses syn-
onyms from WordNet to encode binary bits. The authors
relied on ambiguity that would make it hard for the adversary
to perform automatic disambiguation. The ambiguity comes
from using synonyms that are “homographs” (having multiple
meanings) to encode the message.
In our re-implementation, we first form a list of words (in
the dataset vocabulary) to be replaced by finding the words
that have homographs (at least 2) in their synonym sets. We
randomly divide each homograph set to two disjoint sets to
encode ‘1’ and ‘0’ bits (bit-holding words). To have a unique
encoding and decoding, we make sure no single word is
assigned multiple values by being found in different words
synonym sets. Therefore, we skip a word if it was already
assigned a value.
To encode the message, we find the occurrences of this list
of words in the sentence. We replace each word by a ‘1’ or
‘0’ synonym according to the current bit in the message. We
repeat until all bits are encoded. According to [19], we repeat
the message again after it has been successfully encoded to
introduce further ambiguity. The decoding is then done by
simple dictionary lookups. We use a message length of 4 bits
similar to our setup. To have unique decoding, we replace
any accidental occurrences of the ‘bit-holding’ words in the
original text by their corresponding synonym in the ‘replace’
Model Acc. SBERT F1
Synonym 83.9% 3.62 0.98
AWT 86.8% 0.956 0.53
TABLE VIII: Comparing AWT and the synonym substitution
baseline in terms of bit accuracy, SBERT distance, F1 score.
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Fig. 12: Comparing AWT and the synonym substitution base-
line bit accuracy under ‘remove’ and ‘replace’ attacks.
list. This prevents unintentional encoding. We highlight this
important advantage of our model; AWT does not impose such
restrictions on the used words since there are no words that
are exclusive to the message encoding (as per Figure 10).
We again evaluate this baseline across the different evalua-
tion axes: effectiveness (utility and bit accuracy), secrecy and
robustness. For effectiveness, we compute the bit accuracy
and SBERT distance. For secrecy, we train a transformer-
based classifier with the same setup as in Section V-C. We
show a summary of these two evaluation factors in Table VIII.
We compare the baseline against AWT at a comparable bit
accuracy level (resulted from sampling from the model) for a
fair comparison. We summarize our findings as follows: 1) The
message encoding was not successful in all sentences since not
all sentences have words from the fixed ‘replace’ list. 2) At an
even higher bit accuracy level, AWT has a considerably lower
SBERT distance. 3) The baseline has a very high F1 score
compared to the F1 score of AWT .
For robustness, we apply the words removing and replacing
attacks as in Section V-D. We do not apply the DAE attack
since some words used in the baseline method might be Out-
of-Vocabulary words with respect to the DAE. As shown
in Figure 12, the baseline is more sensitive to attacks since
the encoding changes a larger amount of words compared to
AWT . The ‘replace’ attack is even stronger than the ‘remove’
attack; not only can it remove the original ‘bit holding’ words,
but it can also introduce accidental wrong encoding by adding
other ‘bit holding’ words instead of regular words.
This analysis shows that AWT achieves a significantly better
trade-off between the three different evaluation axes.
2) Generation-based hiding: An alternative strategy to the
translation-based data hiding of the generated text (as a post-
processing step) is to generate text that is already encoded
with the input message [45]. Unlike previous generation-based
steganography work that relied on masking [45], we jointly
train a language model (in contrast to AWT , an autoencoder
and thus bidirectional) with a message decoder. We used the
same AWD-LSTM language model in [73]. In our case, it takes
the input word added to the input message at each time step
and is trained to predict the next word given previous words.
The message decoder takes the generated sequence and is
trained to reconstruct the input message. The model is trained
jointly with both losses. More details are in Appendix VII-D.
We evaluate the model using the perplexity (i.e. exponential
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Fig. 13: AWD-LSTM with data hiding showing different
operating points that vary in perplexity and bit accuracy. The
baseline perplexity is the AWD-LSTM without data hiding.
of the model loss, lower is better) and the bit accuracy. The
ideal perplexity would be the perplexity of the AWD-LSTM
without data hiding. As shown in Figure 13, a very high
bit accuracy can be achieved with around 12 points increase
in perplexity (second operating point). The perplexity could
be further reduced by tuning the weights between the two
losses, which also decreases the bit accuracy, similar to the
previously discussed trade-off between utility and message
accuracy. However, the main limitation we encountered is that
message accuracy further drops at inference using recursive
greedy decoding; when the model is not given ground-truth
context. Although it improves with averaging 2 sentences, it
indicates that it would be even harder to retain high accuracy
using other decoding strategies that introduce more variation
in generations, such as top-k or top-p sampling [5], [8],
[13], [89]. These strategies are typically used in open-ended
generations due to having higher quality output [89].
In contrast, AWT does not suffer from these discrepancies
since it can be applied agnostically on the generated sequence
regardless of the decoding strategies and the language model.
F. Human Evaluation
It is common for machine translation and generation tasks
to use human evaluation as an auxiliary evaluation besides the
other metrics [46], [5]. Therefore, we conducted a user study in
order to evaluate the naturalness and correctness of our model,
as a proxy to measure the stealthiness of the watermark.
The study is conducted on the best variant of the model
(with fine-tuning) with best-of-20 samples strategy (bit accu-
racy: ∼86%) and on the synonym baseline in Section V-E1
(bit accuracy: ∼83%). It was performed by 6 judges who were
asked to rate sentences (each question has 1 or 2 sentences)
with a Likert scale from 0 (lowest) to 5 (highest). The ratings
are described with instructions that range from: ‘This sentence
is completely understandable, natural, and grammatically cor-
rect’, to: ‘This sentence is completely not understandable,
unnatural, and you cannot get its main idea’. We included
random sentences from AWT , the synonym-based baseline, and
the original non-watermarked text, and we displayed them in
a randomized order. We included the non-watermarked text
to work as a reference to the two approaches. The rating of
the original text might not always be ‘5’ (the highest), since
the dataset has processing tokens that might make it slightly
AWT Synonym-baseline Non-wm Dataset
4.5±0.76 3.42±1.16 4.65±0.62
TABLE IX: The results of a user study to rate (0 to 5)
sentences from AWT , the baseline, and non-watermarked text.
ambiguous. To avoid bias, judges were not told that some
sentences were edited and some were not. In addition, the
used sentences were not repeated across the three conditions
studied. We used a total of 340 questions (1-2 sentences each).
We show the average rating for each case in Table IX, where
it can be observed that AWT had both higher ratings and less
variance than the baseline. The high variance in the case of
the baseline can be attributed to the observation that not all
sentences were successfully encoded with the full 4 bits, and
therefore, some of the sentences did not have a lot of changes.
However, in the case of successful encoding, the sentence
generally undergoes a lot of changes compared to AWT (at
least 4 changed words in addition to the counter substitutions
to avoid unintentional encoding), where usually not all of them
are consistent. The full descriptions of the different ratings and
more details about the study are in Appendix VII-E.
VI. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we present a new framework for language
watermarking as a solution towards marking and tracing the
provenance of machine-generated text. We propose AWT as
the first end-to-end data hiding solution for natural text. AWT
is optimized to introduce the least amount of changes to the
cover text and at the same time hide the data by training
against an adversary. We optimize the network using further
auxiliary losses that help to keep the semantics and correctness
of the cover text. We further study different inference strategies
to increase the text utility such as sampling and selective
encoding and their trade-off with bit accuracy. We evaluate
different approaches to aggregate multiple sentences, which
allows the use of ‘higher utility’ operating points of the model.
Besides, we evaluate the data hiding secrecy by training
independent classifiers; we found that the adversarial training
setup greatly helps to conceal the existence of the information
since it conceals the data without fixed substitutions of words
or obvious artifacts to the language statistics. Moreover, our
data hiding scheme was robust against the random local
changes attacks that we studied; removing the watermark
requires significant changes to the watermarked text. Also, de-
noising attacks were less effective in the case of the adversarial
training setup used in AWT due to its higher naturalness.
Our approach achieves more flexibility and a significantly
better trade-off between the different evaluation axes, in terms
of quantitative, qualitative, and human evaluations, compared
to a rule-based synonym substitution baseline. In addition, our
work offers a new research area of automatic data hiding in
natural language, similar to its precedent in images.
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VII. APPENDIX
A. Metrics Analysis
We show more examples to examine and validate the metrics
we use to evaluate or sort the output of the model.
1) Sampling: In Section V-B5, we discussed that the lan-
guage model loss gives slightly better sentences in terms
of syntactic correctness than SBERT, therefore, we used it
to sort and select the best sample. In Table X, we show
examples of such cases. Nevertheless, we still measure the
semantic similarity using SBERT as a metric due to the
benefits discussed below.
2) SBERT and Meteor: In our analysis, we use the SBERT
distance between the input and output sentences’ embeddings
as an auxiliary metric besides using the meteor score. We here
demonstrate examples of sentences with high SBERT distance
and the advantages of using it over meteor only.
One of the cases that yields a high SBERT distance is
when the output text has a changed sentiment (e.g. by using
a negation), such as the two examples in Table XI. These
examples do not have an extremely low meteor score since
not a lot of words were changed. The first example also
is grammatically correct (using “are ’t”). Despite that, they
undesirably change the semantics of the input sentence, which
is detected by the SBERT since it was trained on the NLI task.
Additionally, we show in Table X two samples for the same
input sentence and comparable meteor scores, however, the
one with the lower SBERT distance has more coherency.
Given these observations, and the qualitative analysis we
performed in Section V-B5 (e.g. on the ‘no-discriminator’
model that has a comparable meteor score but higher SBERT
distance), we found that using SBERT is an effective metric
to approximate semantic similarity and adds more information
than using meteor alone.
B. Visualizations
We show, in Figure 14, a visualization for the most frequent
words that were changed in the original text, and in Figure 15,
the most frequent words that were changed to in the water-
marked text. As can be observed the most frequent words in
both figures are highly overlapping, therefore, we analysed the
pairwise transitions between them in Figure 10. As we showed
in Figure 9 and Figure 10, the model keeps the count of these
top words similar, and it does not perform fixed substitutions
between them. These factors support the encoding secrecy
with no telltale words. Besides, there are no words that are
Input SBERT sample LM sample
The new M @-@ 120 designa-
tion replaced M @-@ 20 south of
<unk> . M @-@ 82 now ran from
<unk> to <unk> only.
The new M @-@ 120 designa-
tion replaced M @-@ 20 south of
<unk> . M @-@ 82 now ran were
<unk> to <unk> only.
The new M @-@ 120 designation
replaced M @-@ 20 south that
<unk> . M @-@ 82 now ran from
<unk> to <unk> only.
The city continued to grow thanks to
a commission government’s efforts
to bring in a booming automobile
industry in the 1920s.
The city continued to grow thanks to
a commission government’s could
to bring in a booming automobile
industry in the 1920s.
The city continued to grow thanks to
a commission government’s efforts
to bring in a booming of industry
in the 1920s.
TABLE X: Examples of input sentences, the best SBERT sam-
ple, and the best language model sample. In these examples
the language model gave slightly better sentences.
Input Output SBERT Meteor
there are also many species of
<unk>. There are three main routes
which ascend the mountain , all of
which gain over 4 @,@ 100 feet (
1 @,@ 200 m ) of elevation.
there are ’t many species of
<unk>. There are three main
routes which ascend the mountain
, all of which gain over 4 by 100
feet ( 1 by 200 m ) of elevation.
7.5 0.93
Her family had originally come
from Poland and Russia . <unk>
’s parents had both acted as chil-
dren . <eos> In a 2012 interview ,
<unk> stated : ” There was never
[ religious ] faith in the house
Her family as originally come with
Poland and Russia . <unk> ’s par-
ents had both acted by children
. <eos> In a 2012 interview ,
<unk> stated : ” There was with
[ religious ] faith in the house
7.19 0.93
TABLE XI: Examples in which changing the sentiment (by
introducing or adding negation) resulted in a relatively high
SBERT distance. Only parts of the text segment are displayed
for illustration.
Input Output SBERT Meteor
This allegation became more widely
known when <unk> Alexander
was featured in the documentary
The Search for <unk> , which has
been cited by several authors includ-
ing Gerald <unk> , an expert on
<unk> . Towards the end of the
song , there is a line ” Feeding off
the screams of the <unk> he ’s
creating ” , which was taken from
the film The Boys from Brazil in
which Dr. <unk> was the villain.
This allegation became more widely
known when <unk> Alexander
was featured in the documentary of
Search for <unk> , which has was
cited by several authors including
Gerald <unk> , from expert on
<unk> . Towards the end of the
song , there is a line ” Feeding off
the screams of the <unk> he ’s
creating ” , which was taken from
the film from Boys from Brazil in
which Dr. <unk> was the villain .
1.55 0.941
This allegation became more widely
known when <unk> Alexander
was featured in the documentary
The Search for <unk> , which has
been cited by several authors includ-
ing Gerald <unk> , an expert on
<unk> . <eos> Towards the end
of the song , there is a line ” Feeding
off the screams of the <unk> he ’s
creating ” , which was taken from
the film The Boys from Brazil in
which Dr. <unk> was the villain .
This allegation became more widely
known when <unk> Alexander
was featured in the documentary
of Search for <unk> , which has
been cited by several authors includ-
ing Gerald <unk> , an expert on
<unk> . Towards the end of the
song , there is a line ” Feeding off
the screams of the <unk> he ’s cre-
ating ” , which was taken from the
film of Boys from Brazil <unk>
which Dr. <unk> was the villain .
1.17 0.939
TABLE XII: Two samples for the same input text segment.
Although they have comparable meteor scores, the sample
with the lower SBERT distance shows better coherence.
particularly exclusive for bit holding, which has a flexibility
advantage over the rule-based substitution baseline discussed
in Section V-E1.
C. Denoising
We show, in Figure 16, an overview of the denoising autoen-
coder (DAE) that we used. We used 6 encoding and decoding
transformer layers in the encoder and decoder, respectively.
We also share the embeddings of the encoder, decoder, and
the pre-softmax layer (dimension: 512).
a) Denoising non-watermarked text: We first evaluate
the DAE individually (regardless of the watermark) by apply-
ing the noise to the non-watermarked test set. We compare the
Fig. 14: Words that was replaced in the original text. Bigger
fonts indicate higher frequencies.
Fig. 15: Words that the model changed to in the watermarked
text. Bigger fonts indicate higher frequencies.
similarity to the original text before and after denoising using
the meteor and SBERT scores which we show in Table XIII.
We observed that denoising partially reconstructs the original
sentence, however, it can introduce additional changes. We
illustrate by the examples shown in Table XIV that we
categorize into three parts. In the first one, we show examples
where the denoised sequence matches the original sequence;
this was mainly for sentences with syntactic inconsistencies
that removed common/likely words. In the second part, the
DAE removed the added noise with more likely sequences, yet,
it did not restore the original one which might cause semantic
differences. In the third part, the noise words were not changed
in the denoised text. This analysis suggests that the DAE is
more likely to change sequences with structure and syntactic
mistakes, but it is also likely to cause other changes that were
not corrupted. We validate this observation by examining the
denoising output of the watermarked text.
b) Denoising watermarked text: In Table XV, we show
examples of the DAE output when applied to watermarked text
without additional noise (based on the results in Table VII).
We again categorize these examples into three parts; the first
is the examples where the watermarking changes were not
changed by the DAE. Second, we show examples where
they were changed; these examples are from different model
Transformer 
encoder layer
...
...
autumn , he met Li
Word embeddings
Position embeddings
+
In unreleased
Transformer 
decoder layer
...
...
autumn , he metIn0 the
Word embeddings
Position embeddings
+
           ...
Softmax
autumn , he metIn the Li
Labels 
(non-noisy sequence)
Attention
Noisy input sequence Shifted non-noisy sequence
Output sequence
Fig. 16: Denoising autoencoder overview.
Text Meteor SBERT
Corrupted 0.947 2.7
Denoised 0.956 2.25
TABLE XIII: The similarity to the original sequence in case
of the corrupted and denoised text.
Input Corrupted Denoised
Usually , the left claw is the <unk> Usually Sylvester the left claw is the
<unk>
Usually , the left claw is the <unk>
Mating occurs in the summer Mating occurs in Hibari.Ch. sum-mer
Mating occurs in the summer
the complex is broken up by the complex People broken up by the complex is broken up by
pair of claws pair 1941 claws pair of claws
when you don ’t when you tendencies ’t when you don ’t
his earliest surviving poem , his earliest surviving poem bill his earliest surviving poem ,
he was arrested He demolition arrested He was arrested
attempted to join the court attempted to Desiree the court attempted to take the court
Commissioner of Education in
<unk>
Commissioner of Education M1822
<unk>
Commissioner of Education and
<unk>
He next spent around six weeks Dreamers next Punch around sixweeks
The next day around six weeks
He appeared to be a <unk> son police appeared to be a <unk> son police appeared to be a <unk> son
Like many other poems in the Tang Like many other poems in roofTang
Like many other poems in roof ,
based on emotion rather than
calculation
based on emotion rather than
Azerbaijan
based on emotion rather than
Azerbaijan
The tenor of his work changed The luck of his work changed The luck of his work changed
TABLE XIV: DAE output when applying word replacement
noise to non-watermarked test set.
Input Watermarked Denoised
The eggs hatch at night The eggs hatch with night The eggs hatch with night
and a mass of 6 kilograms and a mass as 6 kilograms and a mass as 6 kilograms
several years writing for the televi-
sion sitcoms Grace Under Fire
several years writing for the televi-
sion of Grace Under Fire
several years writing for the televi-
sion of Grace Under Fire
He also performed as an actor and
a singer
He had performed as an actor and
a singer
He had performed as an actor and
a singer
he took the civil service exam he an the civil service exam he was the civil service exam
The first RAAF helicopters were
committed to
. with first RAAF helicopters were
committed to
. The first RAAF helicopters were
committed to
consisting of an infantry battalion consisting of been infantry battalion consisting of two infantry battalion
, but the species is also widely
known as
Bunbury but the species is also
widely known as
, but the species is also widely
known as
This occurs because , in life , the
red pigment
This occurs because , in life , the
red pigment
This occurs because , in particular
, the small pigment
and adopts a <unk> lifestyle and adopts a <unk> lifestyle and has a <unk> lifestyle
The last distinct population The last distinct population The last major population
TABLE XV: DAE output when applied to watermarked text
(from different model’s variants).
variants, and they generally cause grammatical mistakes, this
explains the large drop in the ‘no-discriminator’ model. Third,
we show examples where the DAE introduced additional
changes to sequences that were not originally changed by the
watermarking model, this increased the SBERT distance in the
first two rows in Table VII.
We observed other cases where the watermarking changes
were not altered by the DAE even when having other subtle
grammatical mistakes, these changes might be removed by
training a stronger DAE (e.g. larger model or larger dataset),
however, we argue that this requires an even more experienced
attacker with more technical knowledge and more powerful
computational resources.
D. Generation-based hiding
In this section, we present more details about the baseline
of generation-based hiding discussed in Section V-E2.
1) Architecture: We used the AWD-LSTM proposed
in [73]. It is a 3-layer left-to-right LSTM with many regu-
larization and optimization techniques, such as dropout on the
hidden-to-hidden weights, weight tying, and averaged stochas-
tic gradient descent (ASGD). We use the implementation
published by the authors4.
4https://github.com/salesforce/awd-lstm-lm
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Fig. 17: Training the AWD-LSTM language model jointly with
message decoding. The language model should predict the next
word given the previous sequence and simultaneously encode
the message.
As shown in Figure 17, we add a ‘data hiding’ component
by feeding the message to the language model LSTM and
simultaneously train a message decoder that is optimized
to reconstruct the message from the output sequence. The
input message is first passed to a linear layer that matches
the embeddings’ dimension, it is then repeated and added
to the words embeddings at each time step. The language
model is then trained with the cross-entropy loss: L1 =
Epdata(S)[− logPmodel(S)].
To allow end-to-end training, we use Gumbel-Softmax, sim-
ilar to AWT . The message decoder has a similar architecture
to the AWD-LSTM and it takes the one-hot samples projected
back into the embedding space. To reconstruct the message,
the hidden states from the last layer are average-pooled and fed
to a linear layer with the same output size as the message. We
tie the weights between the embedding layer in the language
model and the message decoder, in addition to the pre-Softmax
weights. The message reconstruction loss is the binary cross-
entropy: L2 = −
∑q
i=1 bi log(b
′
i) + (1− bi) log(1− b
′
i).
The model is trained with a weighted average of both losses:
L = w1 ∗ L1 + w2 ∗ L2.
2) Training details: We used the same hyperparameters
of [73], however, we found it essential to decrease the learning
rate of ASGD than the one used; we use an initial learning
rate of 2.5 instead of 30 for the language modelling LSTM
and a smaller learning rate of 0.5 for the message decoding
LSTM. We also found it helpful for a successful message
encoding to pre-train the AWD-LSTM of the message decoder
as a language model. These factors helped to reach a balance
between the two losses.
Rating Description
5 The text is understandable, natural, and grammatically and structurally
correct.
4 The text is understandable, but it contains minor mistakes.
3 The text is generally understandable, but some parts are ambiguous.
2 The text is roughly understandable, but most parts are ambiguous.
1 The text is mainly not understandable, but you can get the main ideas.
0 The text is completely not understandable, unnatural, and you cannot
get the main ideas.
TABLE XVI: Ratings explanations given in the user study.
Following the original implementation, we finetune the
model after the initial training by starting the training again
with the same parameters, to allow the ASGD optimizer to
restart the averaging. Similar to AWT , we use a message length
of 4 bits sampled randomly during training. To allow multiple
operating points of text utility vs. bit accuracy, we finetune the
model again with assigning lower weight to the message loss.
We start the training by w1 = 1, w2 = 2, and decrease w2 for
each finetuning step to reach a new operating point. We use a
varying sequence length during training as in [73].
E. Human Evaluation
We demonstrate in Table XVI the ratings’ descriptions given
in the instructions of the user study. In Figure 18, we show
a histogram of ratings given to the three types of sentences
included. We show in Table XVII, the per-judge averaged
ratings where we can observe that all judges gave AWT higher
ratings than the baseline. We show examples of the baseline
sentences in Table XVIII along with the corresponding original
sentences (paired sentences were not included in the study).
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Fig. 18: Histograms of ratings given to the three types of
sentences in the user study.
Non-watermarked Watermarked Baseline
4.86±0.4 4.76±0.47 3.4±1.28
3.98±0.96 3.98±1.09 3.57±1.21
4.47±0.62 4.13±0.64 3.37±0.81
4.77±0.48 4.58±0.61 3.32±1.02
4.84±0.44 4.71±0.49 3.4±1.09
4.8±0.52 4.63±0.6 4.03±1.19
TABLE XVII: Per-judge averaged ratings for the three types
of sentences.
Input Synonym-baseline
Caldwell said it was easy to obtain guns in New
Mexico : ” we found it was pretty easy to buy guns
.
Caldwell said it was soft to obtain artillery In
New Mexico : ” we rule it was pretty soft to
purchase accelerator .
Caldwell said she and <unk> went to a university
library to find the identity ” of someone dying
very young ” , next went to public records and
asked for a copy of a birth certificate
Caldwell said she and <unk> went to a university
library to found the identity ” of someone dying
real new ” , adjacent went to public records and
asked for a replicate of a parentage certification
However , despite much speculation of an immi-
nent movie , on 26 October 2003 , Variety reported
that MGM had completely pulled the <unk> on
this project
However , Despite Often meditation of an im-
minent movie , On 26 October 2003 , Variety
reported that MGM had completely pulled the
<unk> On this proposed
TABLE XVIII: Examples of the synonym substitution baseline
sentences that were included in the user study.
